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Medicare uses a risk adjustment model to prospectively determine expenses for Part C
(Medicare Advantage) beneficiaries; this provides a financial incentive to report higher
diagnosis code specificity in order to receive greater reimbursement. There has been little
published research on diagnosis coding variation in physician practices, and the number
of Medicare Advantage patients continues to rise. This study seeks to determine if ICD-9CM code specificity for chronic kidney disease, hypertension and diabetes treated in
physician office visits increased after the creation of the Hierarchical Condition Category
payment methodology for Medicare patients in 2004. A retrospective review of claims
data from MEDPAR’s and MarketScan® was conducted and showed increased
specificity for chronic kidney disease and diabetes in both data sets over a four year
period. However, the Medicare 5% sample revealed a decrease in specificity for
hypertension during the same time frame in contrast to the MarketScan® sample. Further
research is needed on coding accuracy and reasons for increased diagnosis code
specificity in the physician office setting.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Physician reimbursement in the United States changed significantly when Medicare Part
B was implemented in 1965. Earlier insurance plans such as Blue Shield paid patients for
covered events, with the understanding they were to reimburse their physician for the care
received (Morrisey, 2014). Medicare paid physicians based on a profile of “usual, customary,
and reasonable” fees (Preskitt, 2008). The Health Maintenance Act of 1973 added managed care
and health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to the health care vocabulary with the goal of
increasing the quality of care while decreasing costs (Preskitt, 2008). Unfortunately, HMOs
never reached the predicted level of popularity, and in 1989 the resource-based relative value
scale (RBRVS) became the new basis for the Medicare fee schedule (Berenson & Rich, 2010).
These fee for service (FFS) models were established at a time when health care focused on
treating acute illnesses and were less effective when it came to managing chronic conditions.
Under the new methodology, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) pay
for Medicare Part B beneficiary care based on CPT codes representing the volume and intensity
of services rendered. This contrasts with inpatient hospital reimbursement, which is tied to
diagnosis codes. Medicare Part C, also known as Medicare Advantage (MA), was created in
1982 through the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act as an alternative to traditional
Medicare insurance coverage (McGuire, Newhouse & Sinaiko, 2011).

Risk Adjustment
Risk adjustment (RA) began with the Medicare prospective payment system in 1983,
when diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) based on International Classification of Diseases (ICD)
codes were utilized to reimburse hospitals (Quinn, 2014). The Balanced Budget Act of 1997
required adjustments to capitation payments according to health status, and after the Medicare
Modernization Act of 2003, CMS implemented an RA methodology for MA patients. Physician
practices fully incorporated RA in 2007 with the creation of Hierarchical Condition Categories
(Kronick & Welch, 2014).
HCCs are a form of RA used for MA patients, based on diagnosis codes, which portray
the complexity of the patient in order to estimate future health care expenditures (Yeatts &
Sangvai, 2016). Under the HCC model, CMS calculates a risk score based on patient
demographics such as age, sex, and geographic location as well as the health status of the patient.
Higher risk scores represent more complex patients, which leads to higher payments to the plan.
The ICD is a commonly used nosology, or systematic classification of diseases, for
reimbursement, administration, epidemiology and health services research (O’Malley et al.,
2005). ICD-9-CM was the diagnosis code set utilized when CMS introduced HCCs. The 10th
iteration of ICD was adopted by the United States in 2014 and contains over 68,000 codes used
to identify patient diagnoses in the inpatient and outpatient setting. In addition to reimbursement,
ICD codes are also used to study patterns of disease, treatment and outcomes in an effort to
identify variations in access to care as well as quality, effectiveness and costs (O’Malley et al.,
2005).
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Financial Incentives
While RA addresses patient enrollment concerns by discouraging insurance carriers from
only enrolling healthy patients, it also provides financial incentive to report as many diagnoses as
possible (Kronick & Welch, 2014). Failing to report a diagnosis code at the highest level of
specificity does not adequately capture the patient’s risk and could lead to reduced
reimbursement (Yeatts & Sangvai, 2016). Upcoding and DRG creep are synonyms for a
phenomenon which was first noted when hospitals realized the potential effects of coding on
their organization’s financial health. These are not limited to the hospital setting, however.
Intentional upcoding in physician practices has typically involved coding a higher level
of evaluation and management service than documentation supports, which is rewarded under
the FFS payment model. However, as a result of the potential for increased reimbursement, MA
plans have increased their efforts to influence physicians to change their diagnosis coding
patterns (Geruso & Layton, 2015). Software vendors and consultants aggressively market
expensive technology and HCC education with promises of capturing millions of dollars through
coding optimization.
The number of MA enrollees continues to rise, and CMS intends to tie 50% of all
Medicare payments to value by 2018 (see Figure 1 below) (Muhlestein, Burton & Winfield,
2017).
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Figure 1: Enrollment in Medicare Advantage Plans Steadily Increased Since 2004
(https://www.kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicare-advantage/)

Kronick (2017) estimates the increase in coding intensity, which is the difference
between the beneficiaries’ scores and the scores they would have if enrolled in MA, may lead to
an increase in Medicare expenditures of approximately $200 billion over the next 10 years. The
relevant question is whether MA risk scores, primarily influenced by diagnosis coding, are
systematically different from those of traditional Medicare patients (Kronick & Welch, 2014).
The Center for Public Integrity reports overpayments related to inaccurate risk scores
have cost Americans tens of billions of dollars already (Schulte, 2016). Government audits began
to increase with the realization misclassification is a potential danger to federal health care
reimbursement programs. Coding accuracy is a great concern to the health care industry for more
than financial reasons alone. Reliance on inaccurate ICD codes may lead to clinical decisionmaking which is not evidence-based and may impact not only health care costs, but quality of
care and outcomes as well. Therefore, it is imperative to assess ICD coding validity.
4

Research on coding quality typically focuses on hospitals, so further studies of physician
practice coding accuracy are warranted to identify variations between the two types of Medicare
payment systems: FFS and RA. Both models provide unanticipated incentives to “upcode,” or
report codes misrepresenting the patient’s acuity for financial benefit. Litigation related to
fraudulent reporting of diagnosis codes for financial gain has thus far focused on health plans
and alleged upcoding, but physician liability should also be a concern.
Problem Statement
There has been little published research on diagnosis coding variation in physician
practices; most reviews have focused on hospital DRG upcoding. This study seeks to determine
if ICD-9-CM specificity for office visits increased after the implementation of the HCC risk
adjustment payment methodology for Medicare patients in 2004.
Hypothesis
Hypothesis: ICD-9-CM code selection specificity for chronic medical conditions treated
during physician office visits increased after the implementation of HCC in 2004.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The objective of this literature review is to investigate the existing knowledge on
variation in diagnosis code specificity as a result of physician reimbursement changes. The
articles selected for this review were obtained using PubMed, Ovid MEDLINE, Academic
Search Premier and Business Search Premier as the search engines. The following keywords
were used: ICD-9, coding accuracy, upcoding, outpatient, and risk adjustment. The inclusion
criteria were: articles published between 2004 and 2015, available in the English language, from
peer-reviewed journals. Additional articles identified from the bibliographies of available
studies were reviewed.
Importance of Coding Accuracy
Using diagnosis codes submitted to payers as a method of illustrating patient acuity is
only effective if the codes are correctly assigned. Fisher et al. (1992) noted coding of nonclinical data was highly accurate but diagnoses and procedures were less reliable. Their reanalysis of the 1987 National DRG Validation Study uncovered wide variation in diagnosis
coding, leading to the conclusion claims-based hospital data should be interpreted with caution
(Fisher et al., 1992).
Lorence and Ibrahim (2003) noted the problem of inconsistency in judgments derived
from inconsistent coding data as well as the potential for unclaimed reimbursement, or
downcoding, due to increased attention and prosecution of health care fraud cases. They also
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referenced prior studies’ identification of up to 18.6% of payments based on incorrect hospital
ICD-9-CM coding, resulting mostly in overpayments. In addition, an OIG audit revealed a 5%
increase in incorrect physician payments due to insufficient documentation and $4.1 billion in
incorrect payments to acute care hospitals (Lorence & Ibrahim, 2003).
Types and Causes of Errors
Coding errors occur when the ICD or CPT code chosen does not match the medical
record documentation. Unbundling errors, which occur when different components of a
diagnosis are reported separately rather than using a combination code, may be unintentional or
deliberate (O’Malley et al., 2005). Other diagnosis coding errors include: incorrect ICD
category; lack of diagnosis specificity (unspecified code selected when more information is
available); and too much specificity (documentation supports an unspecified code). Causes of
diagnosis code errors include: insufficient coding knowledge; lack of coding experience; poorly
developed EHR skills, haste, incomplete or vague documentation, and desire to meet medical
necessity requirements for diagnostic tests.
O’Malley et al. (2005) cautioned some errors may be specific to the setting because of
differences in coding processes between inpatient and ambulatory. They differentiated between
errors along the patient trajectory and along the paper trail. A potential source of error lies in the
clinician’s description of the diagnosis and his or her clarity in recording the diagnosis,
highlighting the impact of evolving medical knowledge, existence of multiple synonyms for one
clinical condition and common legibility concerns in paper charting (O’Malley et al., 2005).
Rangachari (2007) noted the majority of coding errors are caused by inadequate physician
documentation and rural facilities’ coding is more accurate for quality measurement. FFS coding
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is known to be incomplete and variable, and coding intensity has been found to vary
geographically (Kronick & Welch, 2014).
Lorence and Ibrahim (2003) studied errors in practice settings and concluded disparities
exist between settings, management level and geographic regions. The best coding accuracy rates
were found in the West North Central states and overall poorer coding in organizations with a
larger volume of outpatient visits. The researchers concluded coding is influenced by individual
biases and practice patterns despite standardization of coding systems.
Another potential impact on diagnosis coding is variation in diagnostic practices. Song et
al. (2010) found Medicare beneficiaries residing in regions of the United States with higher
intensity of services were associated with higher reported prevalence of chronic diseases, which
may be due to higher rates of diagnostic testing or to differences in health status.
Professional fee coding education has traditionally focused on procedure codes rather
than diagnoses, because Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) codes have been the driver of
reimbursement. Secondary diagnoses are frequently omitted because there is no financial reason
to include them (Kronick, 2017). In physician offices, coding may be performed by a physician
or non-credentialed staff member in contrast to hospital coding, which is typically performed by
certified coders. Therefore, diagnosis code variation may be related to a lack of coding education
or to insufficient physician documentation rather than an actual change in patient acuity.
O’Malley et al. (2005) described the common practice of coders assigning ICD codes based on
clinician medical record documentation and the need for continuing education on annual coding
rule changes.
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Coding Accuracy in Other Countries
Hennessy, Quan, Faris and Beck (2010) studied ICD-10 coded discharge records in
Canada and discovered life-threatening conditions such as cancer are coded correctly more often
than some non-specific diseases. The results showed an increase in the number of coded records
but a decrease in the number of diagnoses coded. The research team theorized coders may have
less time to code each record, coding practices may have changed over time, or physician
documentation may have become less detailed. Regardless of the reason, they noted the need for
professional coding training and a consistent management structure (Hennessy, Quan, Faris &
Beck, 2010).
The availability of coding training and materials improved over time in the United
Kingdom but the impact on variations in coding accuracy rates is unclear. The authors reviewed
published studies and concluded diagnosis coding quality declined over time, but were more
accurate for high prevalence conditions (Campbell, Campbell, Grimshaw & Walker, 2001).
After the 1998 implementation of ICD-10 in Australia, hospital discharge data was
audited and revealed little change in accuracy with the transition to more detailed diagnosis
codes (Henderson, Shepheard & Sundararajan, 2006). Cheng, Gilchrist, Robinson and Paul
(2009) measured coding errors in Australia and identified poor quality of documentation as the
most significant factor impacting coding error. Misset et al.’s (2008) review of diagnosis coding
by intensive care unit physicians in France was consistent with prior studies demonstrating poor
reliability when coders, physicians or hospital administrators selected codes.
Changes in Risk Scores/Upcoding
Kronick & Welch (2014) utilized the Medicare Enrollment Database, Common Medicare
Environment and Risk Adjustment Processing System administrative files from 2004-2013 to
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analyze changes in risk scores over this period of time and showed a faster annual increase in
MA risk scores than FFS. Geruso & Layton (2015) used yearly county-level averages of risk
scores and MA enrollment by plan type from CMS for the years 2006-2011 and found enrollees
in private Medicare plans generated 6-16% higher risk scores than those in FFS plans. Lorence &
Ibrahim’s (2003) cross-sectional exploratory study included survey data from U.S. health
information managers, revealing variations in coding error rates across practice settings,
population size, market area and patient volume.
Several articles examine the concept of reporting codes, which do not represent services
rendered for financial gain. Bibbins (2007) notes the introduction of the concepts of “upcoding”
and “DRG creep” in the 1990s. A report by the Office of Inspector General defined upcoding as
“the practice of billing for a hospital stay more expensive than the one actually incurred” (OIG,
1998). Synonyms for creep are misspecification, when the diagnosis used to order a test is not
supported by the documentation in the medical record, and miscoding, which is assignment of a
generic code when a more specific one is appropriate (O’Malley et al., 2005). Unbundling errors,
which occur when different components of a diagnosis are reported separately rather than using a
combination code, may be unintentional or deliberate (O’Malley et al., 2005). Kronick (2017)
notes MA plans deny it is wrong to report more diagnoses for their beneficiaries than FFS ones.
Steinbusch, Ostenbrink, Zuurbier and Schaepkens (2006) studied the differences in case
mix systems in the United States, Australia and the Netherlands and discovered market
characteristics such as hospital size and financial situation contributed to higher risk of upcoding.
They concluded there were fewer opportunities for upcoding in case mix systems without forprofit ownership, in which coders are not paid based on DRG assignment.
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Nimptsch (2016) noted an increase in secondary diagnosis coding after hospital
reimbursement reform in Germany, with most of the variation related to improved accuracy in
capturing prevalent comorbidities in cases where coding was relevant to payment. Findings
indicated patients in early periods might have been misclassified due to under-reporting of
secondary diagnoses.
Lorence and Richards (2002) studied the effects of supervisors’ influence on coding
practices, with 43.5% of respondents admitting management sought to promote coding
optimization and 32.9% indicating their coding practices were influenced by specific payers. The
researchers concluded a culture of pressure to misreport health care data based on profit motives
exists in the United States and varies across regions.
Kronick and Welch (2014) reviewed risk scores for all Medicare beneficiaries and found
the average MA risk score increased faster than the average FFS score, largely reflecting changes
in diagnostic coding rather than increased morbidity of MA enrollees. The prevalence of the
highest-paying diabetes HCC category increased from 2.5% in 2004 to 20.1% in 2012 among the
top decile of MA plans, while diagnosis codes for heart attack and hip fracture showed little
variation and was similar to or below FFS (Kronick & Welch, 2014).
In response to concerns about changes in diagnostic coding, the Deficit Reduction Act of
2005 directed CMS to measure and adjust for coding intensity and in the 2010 payment year a
3.41% adjustment was made to reflect anticipated differences between MA and FFS coding
(Kronick & Welch, 2014).
Summary of Findings in the Literature
Deliberate and unintentional reasons for coding errors exist. RA provides an incentive for
physicians to change their coding patterns for financial gain. Deliberate misreporting of ICD
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codes may be a result of influence from a payer or supervisor and are typically related to a desire
to increase a patient’s risk score or satisfy a medical necessity requirement for a diagnostic test.
Unintentional mistakes may be caused by lack of coding education, insufficient physician
documentation or haste.
The number of MA enrollees continues to grow, and overpayments related to inaccurate
risk scores have cost Americans tens of billions of dollars (Schulte, 2016). Relying upon
inaccurate diagnosis codes may also impact quality of care and patient outcomes. Because
research typically focuses on hospital coding quality, it is important to study validity in physician
practices to identify causes of diagnosis coding errors and strategies to address them.
Understanding variations between diagnosis coding for the two types of Medicare payment
systems, FFS and RA, should help to identify deliberate systematic upcoding. While litigation
thus far has focused on health plans, physicians and practice management should be concerned
about liability for diagnosis code assignment even when performed by a coder rather than the
clinician.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Study Objective
There has been little research on diagnosis coding variation in physician practices.
Previous research has focused on hospital DRG upcoding. The objective of this study was to
determine if diagnosis codes for Medicare patients seen in physician offices became more
specific since the HCC model of RA was implemented.
Study Design
This study was a quantitative, retrospective review of claims data from the Limited Data
Set of MEDPAR’s 5% sample from 2012, 2013, 2014, and the first nine months of 2015, as well
as the Truven Health MarketScan® Medicare Supplemental Database from 2010, 2011, 2012,
2013, 2014, and the first nine months of 2015. The final three months of 2015 were intentionally
excluded because the diagnosis codes changed on October 1 when ICD-10-CM was
implemented. The MarketScan® database includes claims for patients with Medicare and a
private supplemental insurance.
Claims for both new and established patient services, represented by evaluation and
management (E&M) levels one through five, with a primary diagnosis of diabetes, hypertension,
or chronic kidney disease (CKD) were selected. Exclusions were all claims provided in places of
service other than the physician office (place of service 11). The diagnosis codes chosen, listed
in Table 3 below, represent chronic conditions with higher payment under RA as well as those
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without additional reimbursement. The dependent variables were ICD-9-CM codes for diabetes
mellitus, hypertension and CKD, and the independent variables were year.
Data Analysis
Multivariate analysis was conducted to establish the prevalence of unspecified diagnosis
coding and identify any trends in code selection over a five-year period, as well as explore any
potential relationship between code specificity and one of the independent variables. ICD-10-CM
codes 250.00, 250.01, 401.9 and 585.6 were designated as unspecified diagnoses, and all others
listed in Table 1 were designated as specified.
Table 1: ICD-9-CM Codes Included in Study
ICD-9CM

Description
Diabetes mellitus without mention of complication, type II or unspecified type, not

250.00

stated as uncontrolled
Diabetes mellitus without mention of complication, type I (juvenile type), not stated as

250.01

uncontrolled
Diabetes mellitus without mention of complication, type II or unspecified type,

250.02

uncontrolled

250.03

Diabetes mellitus without mention of complication, type I (juvenile type), uncontrolled

250.10

Diabetes with ketoacidosis, type II or unspecified type, not stated as uncontrolled

250.11

Diabetes with ketoacidosis, type I (juvenile type), not stated as uncontrolled

250.12

Diabetes with ketoacidosis, type II or unspecified type, uncontrolled

250.13

Diabetes with ketoacidosis, type I (juvenile type), uncontrolled

250.20

Diabetes with hyperosmolarity, type II or unspecified type, not stated as uncontrolled

250.21

Diabetes with hyperosmolarity, type I (juvenile type), not stated as uncontrolled

250.22

Diabetes with hyperosmolarity, type II or unspecified type, uncontrolled

250.23

Diabetes with hyperosmolarity, type I (juvenile type), uncontrolled

250.30

Diabetes with other coma, type II or unspecified type, not stated as uncontrolled
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250.31

Diabetes with other coma, type I (juvenile type), not stated as uncontrolled

250.32

Diabetes with other coma, type II or unspecified type, uncontrolled

250.33

Diabetes with other coma, type I (juvenile type), uncontrolled
Diabetes with renal manifestations, type II or unspecified type, not stated as

250.40

uncontrolled

250.41

Diabetes with renal manifestations, type I (juvenile type), not stated as uncontrolled

250.42

Diabetes with renal manifestations, type II or unspecified type, uncontrolled

250.43

Diabetes with renal manifestations, type I (juvenile type), uncontrolled
Diabetes with ophthalmic manifestations, type II or unspecified type, not stated as

250.50

uncontrolled
Diabetes with ophthalmic manifestations, type I (juvenile type), not stated as

250.51

uncontrolled

250.52

Diabetes with ophthalmic manifestations, type II or unspecified type, uncontrolled

250.53

Diabetes with ophthalmic manifestations, type I (juvenile type), uncontrolled
Diabetes with neurological manifestations, type II or unspecified type, not stated as

250.60

uncontrolled
Diabetes with neurological manifestations, type I (juvenile type), not stated as

250.61

uncontrolled

250.62

Diabetes with neurological manifestations, type II or unspecified type, uncontrolled

250.63

Diabetes with neurological manifestations, type I (juvenile type), uncontrolled
Diabetes with peripheral circulatory disorders, type II or unspecified type, not stated as

250.70

uncontrolled
Diabetes with peripheral circulatory disorders, type I (juvenile type), not stated as

250.71

uncontrolled

250.72

Diabetes with peripheral circulatory disorders, type II or unspecified type, uncontrolled

250.73

Diabetes with peripheral circulatory disorders, type I (juvenile type), uncontrolled
Diabetes with other specified manifestations, type II or unspecified type, not stated as

250.80

uncontrolled
Diabetes with other specified manifestations, type I (juvenile type), not stated as

250.81

uncontrolled
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250.82

Diabetes with other specified manifestations, type II or unspecified type, uncontrolled

250.83

Diabetes with other specified manifestations, type I (juvenile type), uncontrolled
Diabetes with unspecified complication, type II or unspecified type, not stated as

250.90

uncontrolled
Diabetes with unspecified complication, type I (juvenile type), not stated as

250.91

uncontrolled

250.92

Diabetes with unspecified complication, type II or unspecified type, uncontrolled

250.93

Diabetes with unspecified complication, type I (juvenile type), uncontrolled

401.0

Essential hypertension, malignant

401.1

Essential hypertension, benign

401.9

Essential hypertension, unspecified

585.1

Chronic kidney disease, Stage I

585.2

Chronic kidney disease, Stage II (mild)

585.3

Chronic kidney disease, Stage III (moderate)

585.4

Chronic kidney disease, Stage IV (severe)

585.5

Chronic kidney disease, Stage V

585.6

End stage renal disease

585.9

Chronic kidney disease, unspecified

586

Renal failure, unspecified

Limitations
Limitations include the potential impact on data validity from incorrect and/or
inconsistent coding, including underreporting of a particular disease state. The Medicare 5%
sample only included claims from 2012-2015; therefore no comparison was made to the 2010
and 2011 MarketScan® data.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Billing claims from the Medicare 5% Sample and the MarketScan® database for January
1, 2012 through September 30, 2015 were compared, and ICD-9-CM code specificity for CKD,
hypertension and diabetes were examined. MarketScan® claims data from 2010 and 2011 were
also studied. There were a total of 4,476,263 claims with a primary diagnosis for one of these
conditions in the Medicare 5% sample and 20,067,886 in the MarketScan® sample. The
frequency of specific ICD-9-CM code utilization is listed in Table 2 below.
Table 2: Frequency of CKD, Hypertension and Diabetes – Both Data Sets

YEAR

Medicare
5% - CKD
Specificity

MarketScan®
- CKD
Specificity

Medicare MarketScan®
5% - HTN
- HTN
Specificity
Specificity

Medicare
5% - DM
Specificity

MarketScan®
- DM
Specificity

2010

93.5%

74.0%

55.2%

2011

94.2%

74.2%

56.4%

2012

90.6%

94.8%

53.3%

76.5%

37.4%

61.5%

2013

91.0%

95.4%

51.7%

77.2%

38.4%

64.6%

2014

91.4%

96.0%

49.8%

78.8%

39.6%

67.1%

2015

92.0%

96.5%

48.0%

79.2%

41.1%

69.0%

Comparison of average diagnosis code specificity, without regard to level of service,
revealed an increase in both data sets for CKD and diabetes over the four year period from 20122015. However, specificity for hypertension claims decreased in the Medicare 5% Sample, while
increasing in the MarketScan® sample, as shown in Figure 2 below.
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Figure 2: Comparison of Diagnosis Code Specificity per Disease

Chronic Kidney Disease
The Medicare 5% sample included 505,383 claims with CKD as the primary diagnosis.
Of these encounters, 460,900 (91.2%) were reported with a specific ICD-9-CM code. The
MarketScan® database included 3,375,107 claims for CKD, with 3,202,309 (94.9%) reported by
a specific diagnosis code. These findings are included in Figures 3 and 4 below.
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Figure 3: CKD Specificity by Year in Medicare 5% sample

Figure 4: CKD Specificity by Year in MarketScan® sample
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Analysis of the Medicare 5% sample data for CKD, in Figure 5 below, revealed specific
diagnosis code use with level 1 E&M services of 87.8% in 2012, compared to 87.2% in 2013,
85.2% in 2014, and 84.5% in 2015. Level 2 services were reported with specific CKD ICD-9
codes 87.9% of the time in 2012, 88.6% in 2013, 89.4% in 2015, and 89.4% in 2015. Diagnosis
specificity for Level 3 services was 88.9% in 2012, 89.9% in 2013, 90.3% in 2014, and 91% in
2015. Level 4 visits for specific CKD diagnoses were 91.6%, 91.7%, 92.1%, and 92.6%. Finally,
level 5 visits for CKD were 92%, 91.8%, 92%, and 93%.
Figure 5: CKD Specificity by Level of Service & Year in Medicare 5% sample

Analysis of the MarketScan® data for CKD, in Figure 6 below, revealed specific
diagnosis code use with level 1 services of 92% in 2012, compared to 93% in 2013, 93.7% in
2014, and 94.1% in 2015. Level 2 services were reported with specific CKD ICD-9 codes 92.4%
of the time in 2012, 92.6% in 2013, 93.8% in 2015, and 95% in 2015. Diagnosis specificity for
Level 3 services was 94.3% in 2012, 95% in 2013, 95.2% in 2014, and 95.5% in 2015. Level 4
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visits for specific CKD diagnoses were 95.3%, 95.7%, 96.4%, and 96.8%. Finally, level 5 visits
for CKD were 95.2%, 95.6%, 96.1%, and 96.8%.
Figure 6: CKD Specificity by Level of Service & Year in MarketScan® sample

Hypertension
Of the 3,377,967 claims for hypertension in the Medicare 5% sample, a specific primary
diagnosis was included on 1,720,815 (50.9%) of these. Hypertension claims in the MarketScan®
database numbered 39,415,604 with specificity on 23,145,839 (76.1%) of the encounters. These
results are included in Figures 7 and 8 below.
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Figure 7: Hypertension Specificity by Year in Medicare 5% sample

Figure 8: Hypertension Specificity by Year in MarketScan® sample
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Analysis of the Medicare 5% sample data for hypertension, in Figure 9 below, showed
specific diagnosis code use with level 1 services of 52% in 2012, compared to 51.6% in 2013,
50.2% in 2014, and 49% in 2015. Level 2 services were reported with specific hypertension
ICD-9 codes 51% of the time in 2012, 51.1% in 2013, 48.3% in 2015, and 46.4% in 2015.
Diagnosis specificity for Level 3 services was 52.4% in 2012, 50.9% in 2013, 49.1% in 2014,
and 47.4% in 2015. Level 4 visits for specific hypertension diagnoses were 54%, 52.3%, 50.3%,
and 48.3%. Finally, level 5 visits for hypertension were 54.7%, 53.1%, 51.4%, and 48.9%.
Figure 9: Hypertension Specificity by Level of Service in Medicare 5% sample

Analysis of the MarketScan® data, in Figure 10 below, revealed specific hypertension
diagnosis code use with level 1 services of 66.5% in 2012, compared to 64.4% in 2013, 65.2% in
2014, and 64.5% in 2015. Level 2 services were reported with specific hypertension ICD-9 codes
70.2% of the time in 2012, 70.7% in 2013, 72.9% in 2015, and 73.4% in 2015. Diagnosis
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specificity for Level 3 services was 73.5% in 2012, 74.1% in 2013, 75.3% in 2014, and 75.9% in
2015. Level 4 visits for specific hypertension diagnoses were 78.9%, 79.5%, 80.9%, and 89.1%.
Finally, level 5 visits for hypertension were 80.4%, 81.4%, 82.7%, and 83%.
Figure 10: Hypertension Specificity by Level of Service in MarketScan® sample

Diabetes
Diabetes was reported by a specific ICD-9-CM code on 892,913 (39%) of 2,289,643
claims in the Medicare 5% sample. MarketScan® included 9,429,362 claims for diabetes, with
14,458,100 (61%) including a specific diagnosis.
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Figure 11: Diabetes Specificity by Year in Medicare 5% sample

Figure 12: Diabetes Specificity by Year in MarketScan® sample
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Analysis of the Medicare 5% sample data, in Figure 13 below, revealed specific diabetes
diagnosis code use with level 1 services of 34.8% in 2012, compared to 36.6% in 2013, 38.3% in
2014, and 38.4% in 2015. Level 2 services were reported with specific diabetes ICD-9 codes
53.3% of the time in 2012, 54.5% in 2013, 55.9% in 2015, and 57.1% in 2015. Diagnosis
specificity for Level 3 services was 35.5% in 2012, 36.9% in 2013, 38.8% in 2014, and 40.2% in
2015. Level 4 visits for specific diabetes diagnoses were 37%, 37.6%, 38.6%, and 40.2%.
Finally, level 5 visits for diabetes were 44.4%, 45.9%, 46.6%, and 48.7%.
Figure 13: Diabetes Specificity by Level of Service & Year in Medicare 5% sample

Analysis of the MarketScan® data, in Figure 14 below, revealed specific diabetes
diagnosis code use with level 1 E&M services of 55.6% in 2012, compared to 59.3% in 2013,
60.5% in 2014, and 63.2% in 2015. Level 2 services were reported with specific diabetes ICD-9
codes 74.2% of the time in 2012, 77% in 2013, 79% in 2015, and 80% in 2015. Diagnosis
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specificity for Level 3 services was 61.9% in 2012, 65.6% in 2013, 67.4% in 2014, and 69.3% in
2015. Level 4 visits for specific diabetes diagnoses were 60%, 62.8%, 65.7%, and 67.6%.
Finally, level 5 visits for diabetes were 66.6%, 70.2%, 73.5%, and 76%.
Figure 14: Diabetes Specificity by Level of Service & Year in MarketScan® sample
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
This study was conducted to determine if diagnosis code specificity for Medicare patients
seen in the physician office setting increased after the full implementation of HCC in 2007.
Managed Medicare has grown rapidly, with an increased Part C enrollment from 13,702,251 in
2012 to 21,448,250 in 2018 (“Total Medicare”, 2013) (“Medicare enrollment,” 2018). This
change has led to physician reimbursement as more patients’ care is linked to the patient’s
diagnoses rather than the number and intensity of services rendered.
The data indicated ICD-9-CM codes for CKD and diabetes became more specific over
the four year period studied. The MarketScan® sample showed an increase in specificity for
hypertension as well, but the Medicare 5% sample revealed a decrease in specificity over the
same time frame.
The research supported our hypothesis that diagnosis codes became more specific after
HCC implementation. However, differences in the frequency for each condition studied were
noted between the two data sets. Both samples showed a specific ICD-9-CM code was reported
for patients seen in the office for CKD more than 90% of the time. This may be due to the fact
that the fourth digit of the CKD codes corresponds to the disease stage, thus making code
assignment easier, and the definition of each stage is clearly defined by objective measures of
kidney function. Hypertension, which had only three code choices, was reported with a specific
code 50.9% of the time in the Medicare 5% sample and 76.1% in the MarketScan® sample.
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Diabetes frequency was 39% and 61%, respectively, possibly due to the larger number of
diagnosis code options for diabetes based on Type I or II and complications such as neuropathy,
nephropathy, retinopathy, etc.
Reasons for increased specificity over the years may be a new focus on accurate
diagnosis coding as awareness of new physician reimbursement models increased. Medicare Part
C adopted the HCC payment model in 2004 and fully implemented it in 2007, along with a
version for Medicaid patients, and commercial payers have followed. The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 included a similar calculation for payment in the individual
and small group markets, and clinical quality measures such as the Healthcare Effectiveness Data
and Information Set (HEDIS) also rely on diagnosis codes (Kautter et al., 2014). As these
programs became more common, plan representatives began educating physicians and staff on
appropriate diagnosis coding. This may explain the higher frequency of specific codes in the
MarketScan® data set, which includes patients who have private supplemental insurance, than
those in the Medicare 5% sample. CMS clearly anticipated a change in coding patterns and
responded by implementing a coding intensity adjustment which increased from 3.41% in 2010
to 5.91% expected in 2018 (Kronick, 2017).
Another possible factor is the initiation of Meaningful Use incentive payments for EHR
adoption in 2011. These payments from CMS to physicians increased rapidly from 2011-2012,
with a 337% increase in number of eligible providers receiving an average of $15,200 each
(Settles, 2015). According a 2015 brief from the Office of the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology, eight out of 10 physicians had adopted an EHR although only 64% of
solo practitioners utilized one (Leventhal, 2015). Coding in an electronic record has advantages
and disadvantages. While using an EHR saves time and allows a physician to access a list of
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diagnosis codes rather than relying on a code book or a personal list of common diagnoses, the
increased efficiency can be offset by inexperience with computer-related documentation and
code selection.
Coding certification has become more popular over the last decade. The American
Academy of Professional Coders, national credentialing organization for professional fee coders,
reports an increase in membership from 60,000 in 2008 to more than 120,000 in 2012 (Blackmer
& Ericson, 2012). The addition of certified coders to physician practices may have resulted in
increased coding specificity.
The impact of the transition from ICD-9-CM to ICD-10-CM in October 2015 cannot be
overlooked. The list of potential diagnosis codes increased from approximately 17,000 to
155,000 as a result of additional granularity, with the intent of enhancing healthcare data and
improving patient outcomes (Sanders et al., 2012). While services rendered on or after October
1, 2015 are excluded from this study, many organizations naturally began to prepare several
years before; particularly in light of the fact implementation was delayed a year. Therefore,
physician practices who proactively educated clinicians and office staff may have increased their
coding specificity as early as 2012 or 2013.
Limitations
This study has several limitations. The study design is retrospective, and physicians could
not be queried about the validity of the diagnosis codes reported and whether changes in
specificity were unintentional or deliberate. The Medicare 5% sample did not include data from
2010 or 2011 to compare with the MarketScan data from the same period, and data after October
1, 2015 was not included. There may have been significant changes in coding specificity not
included in this analysis.
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Future Significance
Research has shown overpayments related to inaccurate risk scores have cost tens of
billions of dollars (Schulte, 2016). Patient diagnoses are a component of risk calculation that is
under the physician’s control, represented by the ICD-9-CM codes chosen and reported on claim
forms. With CMS’ increased emphasis on payment for value rather than volume of services and
the growing popularity of Medicare Advantage, it is more important than ever to assess the
accuracy of diagnosis coding in the physician office. The lack of research on diagnosis code
specificity changes in the physician office setting leaves policymakers without sufficient
information to fully understand the implications of the financial incentives for physicians to
upcode for increased reimbursement. Even with the limitations noted above, this study is an
important baseline measurement of changes in code specificity in the practice setting after HCC.
However, further research is needed on coding accuracy and reasons for increased diagnosis
code specificity in the physician office setting.
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APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARIES

Medicare 5% sample – CKD
Year

CKDSpec

AllVisits

PctSpec

2012

120,176

132,668

90.6%

2013

122,882

135,041

91.0%

2014

123,727

135,370

91.4%

2015

94,115

102,304

92.0%

Medicare 5% sample – Hypertension
Year

HTNSpec

AllVisits

PctSpec

2012

504,678

947,545

53.3%

2013

475,825

920,403

51.7%

2014

435,725

874,842

49.8%

2015

304,587

635,177

48.0%
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Medicare 5% sample – Diabetes
Year

DMSpec

AllVisits

PctSpec

2012

231,371

618,354

37.4%

2013

235,890

614,683

38.4%

2014

239,692

604,665

39.6%

2015

185,960

451,941

41.1%

MarketScan® sample – CKD
Year

CKDSpec

All

PctSpec

2010

400,359

428,416

93.5%

2011

941,116

999,462

94.2%

2012

491,138

517,834

94.8%

2013

550,662

577,403

95.4%

2014

544,632

567,620

96.0%

2015

274,402

284,372

96.5%
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MarketScan® sample – Hypertension
Year

Total Visits

HTSpec

PctSpec

2010

4,347,983

3,215,364

74.0%

2011

9,495,064

7,048,470

74.2%

2012

4,622,302

3,536,538

76.5%

2013

4,953,989

3,824,266

77.2%

2014

4,796,329

3,778,193

78.8%

2015

2,199,937

1,743,008

79.2%

MarketScan® sample – Diabetes
Year

Totals

DMSpec

PctSpec

2010

2,151,884

1,187,181

55.2%

2011

4,823,594

2,722,698

56.4%

2012

2,363,065

1,454,348

61.5%

2013

2,538,261

1,640,866

64.6%

2014

2,442,341

1,638,620

67.1%

2015

1,138,955

785,649

69.0%
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